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Abstract: A high degree of de facto judicial Independence (JI) 
functions as a crucial precondition of governments to credibly 
commit to legislative decisions, such as respecting private property 
rights. Thus, de facto JI should improve the allocative efficiency and 
may therefore contribute positively to economic growth. But JI as 
formally written down in legal texts is an imperfect predictor for de 
facto JI. This paper tries to identify the forces which determine de 
facto JI. A distinction between factors that can be influenced in the 
short run and those that are the result of historical development 
and that are exempt from short-term modification is made. 
Ascertaining the relative relevance of these two groups of variables 
promises to be policy-relevant. A rigorous empirical model reduction 
process is used in order to cope with the potential excess of 
explanatory variables. The explanatory variables for de facto JI that 
survive the reduction process are de jure JI, legal confidence of the 
public, extent of democratization, degree of press freedom, and the 
religious beliefs of the population. 
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Explaining de facto judicial independence 
1. Introduction 
Why is the judiciary factually independent in some legal systems and highly 
dependent in others? How have some countries managed to turn the promise of an 
independent judiciary into a time-honored commitment whereas governments in other 
countries renege on the promise time and again? The answers to these questions 
promise to be tremendously important. Judicial Independence (JI) as factually 
implemented can be considered as a necessary condition to the realization of the rule 
of law, i.e. government under the law. If the judiciary is not independent from the 
other two government branches, it is their representatives that will rule – and not the 
law. Further, governments may find it difficult to make credible commitments if the 
judiciary is not independent. Under these circumstances, government promises to 
respect and enforce private property rights might remain cheap talk. An independent 
judiciary, on the other hand, may prevent a government to renege against its own 
promises and thus make it possible for a government to credibly commit to its policy 
decisions.  
First empirical analyses explicitly relying on the concept of de facto JI do not reject 
these hypotheses. Feld and Voigt (2003, 2006) show that de facto JI is both 
statistically and economically highly significant for explaining economic growth: a 
switch from a totally dependent to a totally independent judiciary would – ceteris 
paribus – lead to an increase in growth rates of between 1.5 to 2.1 percentage points. 
Increasing de facto JI thus promises substantial returns. But the authors also show that 
simply promising higher degrees of (de jure) JI will not do the trick: the partial 
correlation between their de jure and de facto indicators is a low .22. In other words: 
JI as found in the legal texts is a very incomplete predictor for JI as factually 
implemented. Thus, de facto JI is determined by additional factors. 
It is the purpose of this paper to identify the causes behind the observed levels of de 
facto JI. It thus complements the Feld and Voigt (2003, 2006) papers, where de jure 
and de facto levels of JI were assumed to be exogenously given. Here, the focus is on 
explaining de facto JI, as no correlation between higher levels of de jure JI and higher 
growth rates were found and de facto JI thus seems to be the more relevant variable 
for growth and income. Over the last couple of years, quite a few papers have dealt 
with the economic consequences of alternative institutional arrangements (recent 
surveys of this fast growing field are provided by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson   4
(2004) as well as Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005)). However, precious few 
papers have dealt with judicial behavior as an endogenous variable. 
Hanssen (2004) has recently tested two predictions first generated by Ramseyer 
(1994), namely that judicial independence will be higher if politicians fear to lose 
power and that it will also be higher the farther the ideal points of the rival parties are 
apart. Using judicial retention procedures as the proxy for judicial independence, he 
finds empirical support for these hypotheses by drawing on panel data covering the 
U.S.-states between 1950 and 1990. Also with regard to the U.S., Besley and Payne 
(2003) find that judges tend to decide in favor of important parts of the electorate as 
this might increase their chances of being re-elected.  
This paper adds to the literature in three ways: First, in the theoretical part it explicitly 
discusses both formal factors, such as de jure JI, and informal factors, such as values 
and traditions, as potential determinants of de facto JI. Second, the empirical part is 
based on a cross-country analysis and thus goes beyond the analysis of JI within 
single countries. Third, in order to cope with potential problems regarding too few 
degrees of freedom, a rather novel rigorous model reduction process is applied. 
Reflecting the positive relationship between de facto JI and growth, aid and 
development programs have also focused on judicial independence in recent years. In 
order to evaluate the chances of success of these programs, it is important to analyze 
as many potentially relevant determinants of de facto JI as possible. This is the reason 
why the relevance of informal factors is explicitly inquired into here. More 
specifically, an explicit distinction will be made between explanatory factors that are 
not subject to deliberate change, at least in the short- and medium-term, and 
explanatory factors that could be modified. The ethnic diversity of a society, its 
religious traditions, and its legal history are examples for the first group of factors, the 
number of political constraints of a political system or whether it is a unitary or a 
federal system are examples for the second group. This approach promises to shed 
light on the question to which degree a society has the capacity to establish a judiciary 
that is not only formally independent but that is indeed factually so. 
The empirical analysis shows that five variables are of particular relevance for 
explaining the level of de facto JI. These are (i) de jure JI, (ii) the confidence of the 
population in the legal system, (iii) the degree of democratization, (iv) press freedom 
and (v) religious beliefs of the population. The form of government (democratic vs. 
non-democratic), the degree of press freedom granted, and especially the level of de 
jure JI are subject to deliberate choice. It is not quite clear whether one can easily   5
raise the confidence of the population in the legal system and religious believes 
should be seen outside the choice of today’s policy makers. Our results thus indicate 
that societies can influence the preconditions for high levels of de facto JI – and that 
they can thereby lay the foundations for a higher average growth rate. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: the next section serves to develop some theoretical 
considerations, section three contains information on how we measure judicial 
independence, section four entails a description of the data, our estimation approach, 
and the results, section five is devoted to an interpretation of the results, and section 
six concludes. 
2. Theoretical Considerations and empirical data 
In this section, we develop a number of hypotheses concerning the driving forces of 
de facto JI drawing on economic logic, i.e. we ask what forces can make it costly for 
government not to respect formal JI. Since we later test these hypotheses empirically, 
we already describe the data along with the theory. 
Credibility can be an important asset of a government. If a government that promises 
to enforce private property rights is credible, then actors will invest more than if the 
government was not credible. Higher investment levels translate into additional 
income. This, in turn, leads to higher utility levels for both the governed and the 
governing because higher (aggregate) income also means increased tax revenue. The 
credibility of a government can thus make everybody better off. 
The separation of powers has often been discussed as a way to increase government 
credibility (Landes and Posner 1975, Barzel 1997, Tsebelis 2002). Beyond the 
conventional separation into the three functions of legislating, executing and 
adjudicating, the delegation to independent or non-majoritarian institutions has 
received a lot of attention lately (see, e.g. Majone 2001 or Voigt and Salzberger 
2002). Independent central banks are the most frequently cited example: on the long 
run, everybody profits from stable money. On the short run, however, politicians may 
be tempted to increase their popularity by pushing for an output-stimulating monetary 
policy. If citizens expect this, the short-term positive effects will not materialize but 
the policy will nevertheless be costly because it will lead to a higher inflation rate. 
Delegating monetary authority to an independent central bank can be interpreted as a 
solution to the problem of time-inconsistent preferences as introduced by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977).   6
The creation of an independent judiciary can also be interpreted as an attempt to 
mitigate the problem of time-inconsistent preferences. For example, a government 
might announce at some point in time that it will enforce private property rights, 
hoping that private actors will invest later on. Once invested, government is subject to 
the (short-term) temptation to attenuate the investors’ property rights. If a neutral third 
party (the judiciary) has the competence to ascertain whether any of the conflicting 
players has reneged on its promises, and to force them to make good on their 
promises, incentives to honor one’s promises are substantially increased. 
It would thus seem that rational nation state governments should aim at increasing 
their credibility by creating independent judiciaries. Yet, creating an independent 
judiciary and respecting its independence are not identical. Decision-makers who are 
subject to time-inconsistent preferences and who have delegated decision-making 
power might be tempted to interfere with the decisions of the judges once 
implementing a specific judicial decision appears very costly. Worse yet, unsatisfied 
governments might simply fire some judges or even abolish the independent judiciary 
altogether. This problem has been coined “second order commitment problem” 
(Moser 1999). On a worldwide scale, the effective average term-length of supreme 
court judges is substantially below the term-length to be expected according to the 
statutes of those agencies.1 Formal delegation is thus not sufficient to solve the 
problem of time inconsistency. Hence the question what conditions need to be 
fulfilled in order to make governments honor their own promises – here with regard to 
respecting the independence of the judiciary. 
Actors with time-inconsistent preferences will make decisions that are not in their 
own long-term interest. They thus have an interest in restructuring the relevant 
decision-making situations. Rational actors with time-inconsistent preferences will try 
to transform simple promises (e.g. to enforce private property rights) into credible 
commitments by modifying the relevant payoffs. If, once the time has come to honor 
or break one’s promises, honoring one’s promises leads to higher utility than breaking 
them and this is common knowledge among the participating actors, a simple promise 
has been transformed into a credible commitment. 
One can think of the relevant interactions as a simple non-iterated game (see figure 1 
below): in the first stage, government announces its policies (it could, e.g., announce 
                                                 
1   The effective average term-length of the members of the Supreme Court of Paraguay 
between 1960 and 1990 has, e.g., been a mere 1.1 years (Henisz 2000).   7
to create private property rights and have their enforcement checked upon by an 
independent court), in the second stage, private actors make their investment decisions 
based on the credibility of government promises and in the third stage, government 
decides whether to honor its promises (enforce private property rights) or whether to 
break them (attenuate private property rights). After government has made its choice, 
the private actors can decide whether to take the case to court (stage four). If the court 
decides that government action was in congruence with its promises, the game is over. 
If the court, however, decides that government had broken its promises and that it was 
its duty to make up for it, the next stage follows in which government either accepts 
the court decision (i.e. makes up for the damage it has caused) or ignores the court 
decision. The last stage of the game can be thought of as (part of) society reacting to 
the government’s decision to ignore the judgment of the court. If society is able to 
inflict high costs on the government, the government might prefer to implement the 
judgment of the court. If, however, society is not able to inflict high costs on the 
government, the government might indeed prefer to ignore the court decision over 
implementing it. Possibilities of society to inflict costs on the government are not to 
re-elect it, to criticize it via the press etc. Some possibilities – based both on formal 
and informal institutions – will be discussed in some detail below. 
Figure 1: A Stylized Game 
G = Government; P = Private actors; C = Court; S = Society 
The government will ignore the court decision if that is connected with a higher utility 
level than implementing it. If that is the case, private actors will not make use of 
courts and – more importantly - will choose low levels of voluntary investment. 
Repetition of the game greatly increases the number of possible equilibria. 
Governments might – but need not – honor their own promises because they know 
that what they do in this round of the game affects private actor decisions in the next 
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round of the game. Whether repetition makes governments comply depends inter alia 
on their time preferences. 
The question then is: how can the “ignore the court decision” action be made so costly 
that government will be better off by choosing to “implement the court decision”. 
Two groups of possibly relevant factors will be distinguished, namely institutions that 
can be deliberately created on the one hand, and informal institutions which are not 
subject to deliberate change on the other. It is, of course, possible that factors of both 
groups need to complement each other in order to make the government honor its own 
promises. 
Formal Institutions 
The distinction between “Government” vs. “Court” as used in the simple game is an 
extreme simplification. Government is usually not a monolithic actor but made up of 
many actors, representing different constituencies and thus having heterogeneous 
preferences. If, following a possible non-implementation of an unfavorable court 
ruling, parts of “government” heavily oppose such action, this can reduce the 
likelihood of its occurrence. We have basically described the notion of checks and 
balances where actors who control other actors have an incentive to monitor the 
actions of these other actors and make them remain within the constitutionally agreed 
upon boundaries since any transgression can reduce their own competence. Thus, our 
first hypothesis is that the higher the degree of (factual) checks and balances, the 
higher the costs of meddling with the independence of courts, and the less likely 
interference into the judiciary’s competences are to occur. Recently, it has been 
proposed to make the degree of checks and balances measurable by counting the 
number of veto players found in a political system (Beck et al. 2000); this measure is 
used here. 
Closely related to the number of veto players is the question of whether one is dealing 
with a parliamentary or a presidential system. Parliamentary governments need the 
constant support of parliamentary majorities whereas directly elected presidents do 
not. Only in parliamentary systems has parliament the possibility to inflict costs on 
the chief executive by forcing him out of office during his term. The costs of ignoring 
court decisions – or of tinkering with judicial independence more generally – are 
lower in presidential than in parliamentary systems. Our second hypothesis is that, 
c.p., presidential systems will enjoy lower degrees of de facto JI than parliamentary 
ones. Notice that this hypothesis is partially conflicting with our first hypothesis as the 
separation of powers is higher in presidential than in parliamentary systems. We   9
include a variable here that distinguishes between presidential and parliamentary 
systems based on the Database on Political Institutions (DPI), which was provided by 
Beck et al. (2000).2 
A third possible determinant, also closely related to the first one, is the question of 
whether one is dealing with a unitary or a federal system. Federal systems have a 
larger number of veto players than unitary ones and we would c.p. expect a higher 
degree of de facto JI in federal than in unitary states. An additional layer of 
government means that there are additional actors who might have an interest in the 
federal government playing by the formally valid rules. They have different 
constituencies and thus interests different from the federal government. If the federal 
government tries to meddle with the judiciary, state governments might oppose this 
move and thus make it more costly for the federal government. Our third hypothesis is 
that,  c.p., federal systems will enjoy higher degrees of de facto JI than unitary 
systems. Unfortunately, it is notoriously difficult to “measure” the degree of 
federalism of a given political system. Treisman (2000) contains a dummy variable on 
federalism which is based on Elazar (1995) and Riker (1964). This variable is used 
here. 
In the game described above, the voters or “society” can sanction government by, e.g., 
refusing to re-elect it, criticizing it in the press etc. If voters appreciate living under a 
regime that honors its own promises, a non-implementation of a constitutional 
decision can reduce re-election chances of that government. This argument obviously 
                                                 
2   Presidents often claim that they are the only ones who represent the people as a whole. 
This might make them more audacious than, e.g., prime ministers in reneging upon 
constitutional constraints. Political parties are regularly weaker in presidential than in 
parliamentary systems. This might further increase the incentives of presidents not to take 
formal judicial independence too seriously: if parties are weak, the possibility to produce 
opposition against a president who reneges upon the constitution might be less than in 
systems with strong political parties. A reduced likelihood of opposition does, of course, 
make reneging upon constitutional rules more beneficial. There might be yet another 
transmission mechanism concerned with political parties. Brennan and Kliemt (1994) 
show that organizations like political parties often develop longer time horizons than 
individual politicians: whereas presidents will be out after one or two terms (as in Mexico 
or the U.S.), political parties might opt for staying in power indefinitely (like in Japan). If 
the discount rate of presidents is indeed higher than that of, say, prime ministers or party 
leaders, this might also let offenses against judicial independence appear more beneficial to 
presidents than to prime ministers.   10
presupposes the existence of a democratic regime; the corresponding – and fourth - 
hypothesis reads that democratic regimes are more likely to enjoy a high degree of de 
facto JI than non-democratic regimes. The degree of realized democracy is proxied for 
by the variable “political rights” which is primarily concerned with the right of all 
adults to vote and to compete for public office and which is published annually by 
Freedom House. 
But tinkering with the independence of the judiciary can also be costly if such action 
is widely reported (and criticized) in the press. A free press is hypothesized to be 
conducive to a high degree of de facto JI. Strictly speaking, a free press is not part of 
the relevant institutional structure, but rather a consequence of a certain institutional 
structure. If politicians consider tinkering with the independence of the judiciary, a 
press that is largely free from government interference can make such attempts costly 
– and hence less attractive – for politicians by widely reporting them. At times, a free 
press can be instrumental for helping those opposed to the interference into the 
independence of the judiciary to overcome their collective action problems. The 
indicator used here is also provided by Freedom House and takes into account 
whether or not dissent is allowed, whether there is political pressure on the content of 
the media no matter whether state run or privately owned, whether there is economic 
influence on media content that would distort the quality of reporting, and whether 
there have been any incidents in which press freedom was violated such as murders, 
arrests, suspension and the like. 
Informal Factors 
After having developed five hypotheses focusing on the potential role of institutions 
that can be deliberately created and modified, we now turn to possible determinants of 
de facto JI that are not subject to deliberate choice, at least not in the short and 
medium term. Should the empirical analysis show that these factors are crucial for 
achieving high degrees of factual JI, this would be bad news for policies trying to 
bring improvement about. 
Going back to the stylized game introduced above, the question now is if a society has 
the capacity to inflict substantial costs onto its government should it ignore a court 
decision – or tinker with JI more generally. Suppose a court has issued a decision not 
in line with (short-term) government interests and the government now considers 
ignoring the court decision. If government knows that this would lead to substantial 
opposition, it might be better off implementing the court decision nevertheless. The 
capacity of (parts of) society to produce opposition thus appears crucial. The   11
production of opposition is, however, equivalent to the production of a public good. A 
population’s potential to produce opposition is therefore subject to its capacity to 
overcome the problem of collective action. Voluntary participation in the production 
of public goods is always precarious but there are some factors that make it more 
likely: (1) Relevant parts of the population need to be convinced that it is not fate that 
is responsible for their lot, but - at least to some degree - their individual actions. If 
that is not the case, no relevant opposition can be expected when governments ignore 
court decisions or reduce JI in some other way. (2) It is easier for organized groups 
than for unorganized individuals to oppose government in case it tries to put undue 
pressure on the judiciary because organized groups have already solved the problem 
of collective action. However, the production of opposition remains a public good and 
the conditions under which it can be beneficial for an organized group to participate in 
its provision must be specified. 
Some variables from the World Values Survey can be used as proxies for individual 
attitudes that are a precondition for becoming actively involved in public issues. Since 
they are not directly measuring what we are interested in, we construct a variable 
containing the common variance of the respective variables, which we interpret as 
potential for collective action in a country. Distilling the information of several 
variables into one is also advantageous in the present situation of a scarcity of degrees 
of freedom. We use three such variables to generate a factor “Collective Action” by 
using principle components analysis: 
(1)  Survey respondents were given a list of 15 different types of voluntary 
organizations (from social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived 
people via sports organizations and women’s groups to animal rights) and they 
could indicate (i) whether they belonged to any of these and (ii) whether they 
actively participated in them. Answers to both questions are of interest here: the 
existence of voluntary organizations and a high membership rate indicate that 
people in a specific society have managed to overcome the problem of 
collective action before. 
(2)  Respondents were asked whether they have complete control over their lives. 
Those who think that they do not have much control are less likely to believe in 
the potential of collective action. 
(3)  Finally, one question inquired whether respondents thought that their country 
was run by a few big interests. Again, a higher percentage of people believing 
that this is the case will make it less likely that collective actions are undertaken, 
as people feel powerless.   12
A principle component analysis based on these three variables is run and generates a 
factor that explains 39% of the variance in the underlying variables. The signs of the 
factor loadings are as suggested above and all pass the rule-of-thumb value of 0.5. 
This factor is computed for every country, which makes its absolute value comparable 
in the cross-section analysis conducted below. A high positive value indicates that the 
country has a relatively good potential for solving the collective action problem.3 
The individual attitudes that are conducive (or not) to collective action are caused by a 
number of different influences. It can be argued that religious affiliation is of 
paramount importance (Weber 1920/1988). Religions can propagate the importance of 
individual attitudes, decisions, and actions with regard to the good life. But they can 
also preach that most things are predetermined. Such views are conducive to fatalism 
in which opposition against government would not come to the believers’ mind. We 
test for this by drawing on the share of a population that adheres to a specific religion. 
The likelihood of collective action can further be influenced by the costliness of 
coordinating behavior. If the population is split into many different ethnic groups 
using different languages, coordination will be more difficult. Our hypothesis thus 
reads that de facto JI will, c.p., be higher the more homogenous the population. The 
index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) measures the probability that two 
persons from a given country selected at random do not belong to the same 
ethnolinguistic group. The higher the index, the more heterogeneous the country. 
Easterly and Levine (1997) have constructed a variable “Average ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization” based on the ELF as well as on four additional indicators. The 
partial correlation coefficient between the original indicator and the average indicator 
is high (0.92). The average indicator is used here as it is available for a larger number 
of countries. 
Yet another aspect determining the probability of collective action is the level of trust 
that members of society display against each other. Collective action depends on the 
capacity to cooperate on a voluntary basis. Both Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993) 
have stressed the importance of trust for the possibility to cooperate voluntarily. It is 
thus hypothesized that high degrees of trust are, c.p., one cause for high levels of de 
                                                 
3   From an economic point of view, voluntary participation in general elections is equivalent 
to participate in the voluntary provision of a public good. Voter turnout is therefore an 
alternative indicator that has also been used here.    13
facto JI. Trust data are answers to the question “Generally speaking, most people in 
society can be trusted” taken from the World Values Survey. 
Lastly, we conjecture that the confidence the citizens have in the legal system might 
be conducive to de facto JI. This gives an indication of the informal support the 
judiciary has in the population. Strong public support may not only help to guarantee 
that the codified extent of de jure JI is actually implemented, it may actually increase 
the degree of JI.4 However, the direction of causation is not entirely clear. It might 
also be the case that a high degree of de facto JI increases the confidence of the 
population in the legal system. If this is the case, OLS coefficient estimates of this 
variable might be upward biased and in the empirical implementation we have to take 
that possibility into account. 
The informal variables that have been conjectured to have a causal influence on de 
facto JI have focused on individual attitudes (and their determinants) based on the 
assumption that certain individual attitudes are a necessary condition for collective 
action. They have further focused on the importance of voluntary associations based 
on the assumption that their extent can be important in producing opposition in case a 
government tries to reduce judicial independence. 
Control Variables 
We now turn to a number of variables that could also influence the observed degree of 
de facto JI and for which we thus control. A priori, it is not clear whether good 
institutions lead to higher incomes or whether higher incomes enable societies to 
“afford” good institutions (see, e.g., Chong and Caldéron 2000). We therefore control 
for the log of GNP per capita. This variable can also be justified by asking for the 
incentives of citizens to participate in the production of opposition should government 
try to influence the judiciary: the wealthier citizens are, the more they have to lose. It 
is thus hypothesized that high levels of per capita income increase the citizens’ 
interests in an impartial and independent judiciary. 
Another factor that might influence the results is geography. Here, the latitude of a 
country is controlled for based on the observation that economies in more temperate 
zones have a number of advantages such as less health problems, better conditions for 
agriculture and – possibly – less natural disasters that could also facilitate the 
implementation of a factually independent judiciary. 
                                                 
4   A similar argument related to central bank independence has been made by Hayo (1998).    14
Additional Instruments 
Arguably, there are two variables in our list of explanatory variables that may be 
endogenous, legal confidence and per capita income. In the regressions below, we 
include dummy variables for the legal origin of a country’s commercial law. La Porta 
et al. (1999) distinguish between British (Common Law), Scandinavian, German, 
French and Socialist legal origins as additional instruments. The legal tradition may 
affect the potentially endogenous variables while it is unlikely that they are related to 
de facto JI. 
As another instrument, we use the time that has passed since the Constitution of a 
country has come into force. Again, we conjecture that this variable can affect the 
potentially endogenous variables while it is unlikely that they are an important 
determinant of the dependent variable. 
This concludes our discussion of variables determining a country’s level of de facto 
JI. Before we can turn to the empirical part, we still need to define our dependent 
variable, i.e. de facto judicial independence and the indicator that is to proxy for it. 
3 Measuring Judicial Independence 
JI means that judges can expect their decisions to be implemented regardless of 
whether they are in the (short-term) interest of other government branches upon which 
implementation depends. It further implies that judges – apart from their decisions not 
being implemented – do not have to anticipate negative consequences as the result of 
their decisions, such as (a) being expelled, (b) being paid less, or (c) being made less 
influential. 
Recently, two new indicators measuring de jure as well as de facto JI that aim at 
measuring the most important aspects of judicial independence have been presented 
(Feld and Voigt 2003). These indicators focus on the independence of the highest 
court of a country, no matter whether it is a supreme court or a constitutional court. 
The focus on the highest court seems warranted because even though judges are 
personally independent, the ultimate control of court decisions lies with the highest 
courts, as they review – on the initiative of the parties involved – the lower court 
decisions. The independence of the highest court thus seems crucial. 
Secondly, these indicators are constructed as objective as opposed to subjective 
indicators. A subjective indicator of JI would ask for the perception of independence 
amongst those being polled. For those who live under the respective rules, their   15
perception is surely an important element determining their behavior. However, the 
norms of what an ideally independent judiciary would look like will most likely be 
different in different parts of the world. Data obtained by polls are thus not easily 
comparable. Therefore, the two new indicators aim at objective information. In 
principle, anybody re-estimating JI in the countries covered should end up with 
exactly the same data. 
The indicator measuring de jure JI contains twelve variables, the indicator measuring 
de facto JI eight. The de jure indicator includes variables such as the modus of 
nominating or appointing highest court level judges, their term lengths, the possibility 
of re-appointment, the procedure of removing them from office, their pay and possible 
measures against reduction of their income, the accessibility of the court, the question 
of whether there is a general rule allocating cases to specific judges, and publication 
requirements concerning the decisions of the court. Here, we are more interested in 
the de facto indicator, which is why the variables are described in a little more detail: 
(1–3) A crucial aspect of de facto JI will be the effective average term length of the 
members of the highest court. If the actual term length and the one to be 
expected on the basis of the legal foundations deviate, this is interpreted as a 
signal for a low level of factual independence. Removing a judge before the end 
of term is a serious breach of JI and countries where this has occurred get a low 
score. 
(4)  The influence of a judge depends on the number of other judges who are 
members of the same court. By increasing the number of judges, the weight of 
the sitting judges can be reduced. The de facto indicator takes into consideration 
how many times the number of judges has been changed since 1960. 
(5–6) In order to be factually independent, judges need to be paid adequately. It was 
therefore inquired whether the incomes of judges have at least remained 
constant in real terms since 1960. But the efficacy of courts does not only 
depend on the income level of their judges but also on the number of clerks 
employed, the size of the library, the availability of modern computer 
equipment etc. This aspect has been taken into account by asking for the 
development of the court’s budget as an organization (also since 1960). 
(7)  Any change in the basis of the legal foundation of the highest court will increase 
uncertainty among its potential users, i.e. will be counter to one of the most 
fundamental functions of the law. Frequent changes of the respective legal rules 
are therefore interpreted as an indicator for low de facto independence.   16
(8) The  de facto degree of judicial independence is low if decisions of the highest 
court, in order to be implemented, depend on some action of one (or both) of the 
other branches of government and this cooperation is not granted. The more 
frequently this has been the case, the less independent is JI supposed to be 
factually. 
All variables can take on values between 0 and 1. The unweighted sum of the 
variables is then divided by the number of variables for which information is 
available. The de facto indicator can thus also take on values between 0 and 1. De 
facto data are available for 86 countries (data for both the de jure and the de facto 
indicator can be found in appendix 1; appendix 2 contains a description of the data 
sources). 
4. Explaining de facto Judicial Independence in a Multivariate Setting 
In view of the theoretical discussion above, we cannot get many empirically relevant 
restrictions over and above the choice of variables that should be included in our 
model. However, when there is little guide from theory, we think that special 
emphasis needs to be placed on avoiding spurious relationships. Therefore, our 
modeling strategy is general-to-specific, as advocated by Hendry (1993). This strategy 
ensures that the inferences are statistically valid. Since we have quite a number of 
potentially influential variables, there is the danger that our final parsimonious model 
is not an encompassing model, as inference may be path-dependent. Based on the re-
examination of the vices and virtues of data mining by Hoover and Perez (1999), 
Hendry and Krolzig (1999) develop a model reduction algorithm, that is, according to 
a wide range of Monte-Carlo studies, surprisingly powerful in recovering the 
underlying data generating process (DGP). We apply this approach to the problem at 
hand. 
There are theoretical reasons to suspect that GDP per capita and legal confidence are 
endogenous with respect to de facto JI. To account for any biases in our estimators, 
we instrument these variables. As additional instruments we use dummies for the legal 
origin and the date when the constitution came into force. As an estimator, we utilize 
two-stage least squares. Note that the reduction process takes the instrumentation of 
these variables consistently into account by keeping the set of instruments fixed. 
Removing the exogenous variables that do not survive the testing-down process from 
the list of instruments does not alter our results in any noteworthy way. It is also 
interesting to note that the additional instruments are not significant when included in 
the regression as normal explanatory variables.   17
Table 1: Information on variables 
Variables Sources  Codings 
Dependent variable    
DE FACTO JI  Feld and Voigt (2003)  Continuous between 0 and 1. 
Formal factors:    
DE JURE JI  Feld and Voigt (2003)  Continuous between 0 and 1. 
CHECKS  Beck et al. (2000)  Number of institutions that provide legislative 
“checks”. Average over the years 1975-79. 
SYSPRES  Beck et al. (2000)  Presidential system. Direct presidential 0, strong 
president elected by assembly 1, parliamentary 
system 2. Average over the years 1975-79. 
FEDERAL SYSTEM  Treisman (2000)  Federal system, Dummy (1, 0). 
DEMOCRACY  Polity IV data base  From -10 (dictatorship) to 10 (Western 
democracy). Average over the years 1975-79. 
PRESS FREEDOM  Freedom House  0: no press freedom to 100: Maximum press 
freedom. 
Informal factors    
LEGAL 
CONFIDENCE 
World Value Survey  Average of individual level coding ranging from 
2: very much confidence, 1, -1, to –2: non at all 
(see the Appendix for original wording in 
survey).  
TRUST  World Value Survey  National average of answer to question “Can 
people be trusted?” Yes: 1, No: 0. See Appendix 
for original wording in survey. 
COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 
World Value Survey  Factor estimated using principle component 
analysis using answers on “Active voluntary 
organization membership?”, “Complete control 
over one’s own life?”, and “Country run by a few 
big interests?” See Appendix for original wording 
in survey. 
ETHNIC 
FRACTIONALIZATION 
Alesina et al. 2003  Likelihood that two randomly selected 
individuals belong to different ethnic groups 
RELIGIOUS 
FRACTIONALIZATION 
Alesina et al. 2003  Likelihood that two randomly selected 
individuals belong to different religious groups 
LINGUISTIC 
FRACTIONALIZATION 
Alesina et al. 2003  Likelihood that two randomly selected 
individuals belong to different linguistic groups 
PROTESTANT  La Porta et al. (1999)  Share in % in population. 
CATHOLIC  La Porta et al. (1999)  Share in % in population. 
MUSLIM  La Porta et al. (1999)  Share in % in population. 
ORTHODOX  CIA World Fact Book  Share in % in population. 
Control variables    
LATITUDE  La Porta et al. (1998)  Actual latitude. 
GNP PER CAPITA  La Porta et al. (1998)  Log of per capita GNP. 
Additional instruments    
LOENGL  La Porta et al. (1999)  Dummy (1, 0). 
LOFREN  La Porta et al. (1999)  Dummy (1, 0). 
LOGERM  La Porta et al. (1999)  Dummy (1, 0). 
LOSCAN  La Porta et al. (1999)  Dummy (1, 0). 
LOSOCI  La Porta et al. (1999)  Dummy (1, 0). 
DATE  Various sources  Year when constitution came into force. 
 
A further complication in the present analysis is the uneven availability of data across 
countries. Most of the theoretically interesting variables contain observations for a   18
group of 46 countries (see Table A1 in the Appendix for the list of countries). 
Although the data cover all regions in the world (see Table A2), the sample is not 
necessarily representative of the world population or the geographic location of 
countries. In particular, African countries are very much under-represented, while 
European and South American countries are over-represented. We apply the reduction 
process to the variables of that sample. We then include the variables with fewer 
observations to see whether they have any additional explanatory power, at least 
within the resulting smaller sample. The general unrestricted model for the biggest 
data set includes all variables discussed in the theoretical section and listed in Table 1, 
except for the indicators of federalism and collective action.  
Statistical tests indicate that the unrestricted model based on Table 1 is not an 
acceptable representation of the DGP, as it does not pass the test for normally-
distributed residuals. This rejection is driven by one large outlier (Ghana). As the 
statistical validity of the reduction algorithm depends on the adequacy of the 
unrestricted model, we include a dummy variable for Ghana.5 We also check for 
collinearity, and find a considerable amount of common variation among the 
explanatory variables. The eigenvalues of the second-moment matrix range from 
0.0002 to 9.9. Most of the collinearity is between explanatory variables and the 
constant term. In the testing-down process we try to ensure that the specific model is 
not the result of an excessive influence of collinearity. 
The parsimonious model that emerges from the general-to-specific modeling process 
is listed in Table 2. Column one contains the variables that survive the reduction 
process and the elimination of which would violate a statistical test. The coefficient 
estimates and standard errors are given in columns two and three, respectively. 
Column four contains marginal significant levels and column five estimates of the 
elasticities of the variables measured at their means.  
                                                 
5    Chris Welzel, a member of the Executive Committee of the World Values Survey 
Association indicated to us that the quality of the sample for Ghana is particularly  poor (it 
is only included in a pre-test format, utilizing about 100 observations). Thus, any results 
based on these data should be taken with great caution.    19
Table 2: Specific model for de facto judicial independence 
Variables Coeff.  SE  p-values  Elasticities 
DE JURE JI  0.650  0.200  0.0025  0.72 
LEGAL  CONFIDENCE  0.904 0.265  0.0015 0.64 
DEMOCRACY  0.013 0.006  0.0229 0.01 
PRESS  FREEDOM  0.005 0.003  0.0600 0.27 
CATHOLIC  0.004 0.002  0.0155 0.31 
ORTHODOX 0.012  0.003  0.001  0.16 
PROTESTANT -0.004  0.002  0.092  -0.10 
Notes: The model contains a dummy variable for Ghana (coeff: -0.946, SE: 0.359, p-value: 0.012). The 
implied elasticity estimates are evaluated at the means of the respective variables.  
Row five of Table 3 shows that the excluded variables are not significant at any 
reasonable level of significance, while the preceding row indicates that the remaining 
variables are jointly significant at a level of 1%. Comparing the p-values in Table 2 
indicates that all of the variables remaining in the model are significant at a level of 
10% or lower. The final model explains about 40% of the variation in de facto JI.6 
Figure 1 shows the actual and predicted values. 
                                                 
6    The fit is measured by a Pseudo-R2 based on the squared multivariate correlation 
coefficient.   20
Figure 1: Predicted versus actual values 
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Note: Countries are ordered alphabetically according to the list given in Table A1 of the Appendix.  
Table 3 contains the outcome of applying a battery of diagnostic statistics. None of 
these indicate any misspecification, as the model passes tests for heteroscedasticity 
(White (1980), using squares of regressors), normality (Jarque and Bera (1987), with a 
small-sample correction), misspecification (RESET test based on Ramsey (1969) 
using squares of the fitted values), and instrument exogeneity and functional form 
(Sargan test, see e.g. Davidson and McKinnon (1993)). 
Table 3: Diagnostic information for final model in Table 2 
No of observations  46 
SE equation (σ)  0.24 
Pseudo-R
2 0.41 
Joint test remaining  F(7,38  = 43.5** 
Testing-down F(10,29)  =  0.19 
Heteroscedasticity test  F(15,22)  = 1.99 
Normality test  Chi
2(2) =  4.75 
RESET test  F(1,37)  = 0.01 
Sargan test  Chi
2(13) =  5.00 
Notes: An *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level.  
Adding the indicators for federalism and/or collective action to the model in Table 4 
does not lead to any changes in the conclusion, as these variables are neither 
(individually as well as jointly) significant nor do they effect the other estimates.7 
                                                 
7   When including both federalism and collective action the sample size decreases to 30. The 
joint exclusion test does not reject at any reasonably level of significance: F(2,21)  = 0.07.   21
Moreover, it is important to see whether the imbalance in the sample with regard to 
regions will affect our estimation results. It turns out that none of the regional 
dummies shows significant effects.8 
5. Interpretation of Results 
Concentrating our discussion on the robust influences, i.e. those variables that survive 
the testing down process, the first result of interest is the positive coefficient of the de 
jure judicial independence indicator. Hence anchoring JI by formal laws does increase 
actual JI. What is the meaning of the size of the coefficient? It implies that an increase 
in the index value of de jure JI raises de facto JI by 0.65 points. Although the size of 
the coefficients is not directly comparable, if actual JI were fully explainable by 
written laws then we would expect that the elasticity of de jure with respect to de 
facto JI is one. Computing this elasticity at the means of de facto and de jure JI, we 
get a value of 0.72 for all other variables being constant. Thus, our first important 
result is that there appears to be no one-to-one relationship between de jure JI and de 
facto JI. 
The indicator for the confidence in the legal system by the public shows a positive 
influence. The higher legal confidence, the more independent will be the judges 
factually. Arguably, this supports the point made above, namely that judges can 
increase their independence by generating trust about their work in the general 
populace. Remember that we controlled for the potential endogeneity of legal 
confidence by instrumental variable techniques. Thus, legal trust can be a substitute 
for written laws. It should also be noted that the correlation coefficient between legal 
confidence and general trust in the society is significantly positive (0.37). However, 
the explanatory power of legal confidence for de facto JI is much higher, as it is more 
specific to the question at hand than general trust. Looking at the implied elasticity as 
an estimate of the absolute importance of legal trust, we find that a one percent 
increase will raise de facto JI by about 0.64 percent. This elasticity is slightly lower 
than the estimated value for de jure JI but not significantly so. 
The extent of democratization shows a significantly positive influence on de facto JI. 
In other words, democratic states have, on average and controlling for other 
                                                 
8   After adding regional dummy variables for Africa, Asia, West- and East Europe, and South 
America to the model in Table 2, we cannot reject that their joint impact is zero. F(5,34)  
= 1.22. Neither is any regional dummy significant when included on its own.    22
influences, a more independent judiciary. Again we find this result in accordance with 
our theoretical arguments. Democratic control appears to be relevant in constraining 
an erosion of independence of the judges by legislative action. However, at the sample 
average the impact of democracy on de facto JI is quite small. Our elasticity estimate 
implies that a one percent increase in the democratization index will raise de facto JI 
by 0.01 percent only. Another effective control agency is a free press, as more press 
freedom leads to higher de facto JI. While the coefficient estimate is only significant 
at a 10% level, its elasticity is much higher than in the previous case. A one percent 
increase in the press freedom index leads to a rise of de facto JI by 0.27 percent. 
With respect to cultural background, we find significant results for the share of 
Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox in a country. Opposite to our expectations, the 
share of Protestants has a negative impact on de facto JI. The bivariate correlation 
between these variables is 0.16. Thus, while the unconditional effect of Protestantism 
on de facto JI is positive, it becomes negative after accounting for other influences. 
However, again the coefficient is only significantly different from zero at a 
significance level of 10% and the implied elasticity is not particularly large in 
absolute values (-0.10). On the other hand, significantly positive results are recorded 
for the share of Catholics and Orthodox. The bivariate correlations are -0.02 and 0.02, 
respectively. Hence, the impact of these variables is much more pronounced in the 
multivariate setting. While the elasticity of the Orthodox share is not that big (0.16), a 
one percentage increase in the share of Catholics will increase de facto JI by 0.31 
percent. 
It seems worth pointing out what variables failed to survive the reduction algorithm 
used here: First, none of the institutions traditionally used to describe the architecture 
of political systems, i.e. the degree of checks and balances, the form of government 
(parliamentary vs. presidential) and the vertical separation of powers (unitary vs. 
federal) survived. It may be the case that the impact of these variables is 
overshadowed by our indicators of democracy and press freedom, which could be 
regarded as measuring political outcomes – and not institutions in the sense of rules 
and sanctions that are relatively stable over time (see Glaeser et al. (2004) who have 
criticized those who draw on such variables in an attempt to proxy for institutional 
arrangements). Repeating the general-to-specific modeling process without these two 
indicators leads to a significantly positive influence of parliamentary systems as 
opposed to presidential systems on de facto JI. In other words, the separation of 
powers is less successfully implemented in presidential than in parliamentary   23
systems.9 Secondly, neither the collective action variable nor the ethnic 
fractionalization of societies survived. As these two informal variables are hard to 
modify by lawmakers, this is potentially good news. Thirdly, GNP per capita did not 
survive the reduction process either which means that the potential endogeneity 
problem (high income causing good institutions – and not vice versa) is not relevant 
in this case. 
6. Conclusion  
The starting point of this paper was the observation that de jure JI and de facto JI are 
imperfectly correlated. Hence our first question was how the factually observed levels 
of judicial independence can be explained. The second question dealt with a 
potentially frustrating issue: given that a society’s politicians want to implement a 
factually independent judiciary, to what degree is it in their hands to establish it? 
Asked differently: to what degree does the observable level of judicial independence 
depend on variables beyond the reach of politicians? 
Up to 13 potentially relevant variables were presented above: out of them, five can be 
influenced directly by deliberate institutional choice, whereas eight do not appear to 
be directly influenceable. This large number of potentially relevant variables was 
reduced by using the general-to-specific approach as developed by Hendry (1993). On 
the basis of 46 countries, we find that de facto JI is robustly explained by de jure JI, 
the realized degree of democracy and the freedom of the press all of which can, at 
least indirectly, be modified by institutional choice. The degree of de facto JI is 
further determined by the amount of confidence that the citizens of a country have in 
their legal system as well as by their religious affiliations. The confidence of the 
population in the legal system and perhaps even more so religious affiliations evolve 
over a longer time period and are not variables within easy reach of the typical 
political reformer. 
On the basis of the analyzed sample, de facto JI is thus influenced by at least some 
variables that are subject to deliberate choice. Given that de facto JI appears to be 
                                                 
9   We prefer our original specification, as the result of the reduction process from the general 
model without the two indicators for democracy and press freedom de jure JI no longer 
contains de jure JI as an explanatory variable for de facto JI. In our view, this result 
appears to be too extreme, and suggests that, at least in our case, democracy and press 
freedom are valid indicators.    24
important for allocative efficiency and economic growth, this is good news. The 
highest elasticity estimate is for de jure JI, which means that the most effective way of 
increasing de facto JI is through the creation of formal laws. However, even this 
elasticity is below unity, i.e. the resulting increase in de facto JI will be relatively 
lower than the improvement in de jure JI that has caused it. The elasticity of de facto 
JI with regard to the freedom of the press is 0.27 and that of the degree of democracy 
is only 0.01. Hence, changes in the political system towards more democracy are 
unlikely to affect de facto JI very much. Improving press freedom appears to be a 
much more promising route: First, its relative effect on de facto JI is much higher. 
Second, it is much easier to implement by the government in practice, at least in 
general. Finally, it may be the case that policy makers can even actively influence 
legal confidence. For instance, it may be the case that public displays of respect 
towards judges (given a reasonable degree of de jure JI) may lead to a higher degree 
of trust with respect to the legal system in the population. Given that the elasticity 
estimate of legal confidence of 0.64 is the second largest in our model, there may be 
some scope for improving de facto JI by boosting legal trust. 
Note, however, that these elasticity estimates are only suggestive and might vary a lot 
for any particular case, as they depend both on the actual degree of de facto JI and the 
value of the relevant explanatory policy variable. For instance, the elasticity of de jure 
JI with respect to de facto JI takes on a value of 1.30 in the case of Argentina, while it 
is only 0.63 in the case of Turkey. Thus, the usefulness of any particular factor that is 
amendable for policy makers seeking to increase de facto JI needs to be assessed for 
every particular case. 
   25
Appendix  
Table A1: List of countries in sample 
Country  De jure   De facto   Country  De jure   De facto  
Argentina 0.665  0.333  Japan  0.622  0.900 
Armenia 0.629  1.000  Korea,  South 0.607  0.588 
Australia 0.817  0.819  Lithuania  0.447  0.433 
Austria 0.733  0.900  Mexico  0.804  0.707 
Bangladesh 0.587  0.429  Netherlands 0.631  0.467 
Belgium 0.825  0.806  Nigeria 0.553  0.243 
Brazil 0.907  0.494  Pakistan  0.765  0.525 
Bulgaria 0.397  0.133  Peru  0.485  0.160 
Chile 0.778  0.575  Philippines  0.909  0.731 
China 0.406  0.370  Portugal  0.530  0.706 
Colombia 0.939  0.529  Russia  0.845  0.133 
Croatia 0.570  0.657  Slovakia  0.569  0.319 
Czech Republic  0.761  0.167  Slovenia  0.869  0.431 
Denmark 0.779  0.813  South  Africa  0.681  0.825 
Estonia 0.641  0.700  Spain  0.551  0.750 
Finland 0.544  0.450  Sweden  0.605  0.700 
France 0.634  0.786  Switzerland  0.459  0.943 
Georgia 0.893  0.850  Taiwan  0.575  0.863 
Germany (West)  0.729  0.800  Turkey  0.774  0.800 
Ghana 0.464  0.300  Ukraine  0.703  0.543 
Hungary 0.628  0.821  Uruguay  0.577  0.450 
India 0.629  0.708  USA  0.685  0.592 
Italy 0.793  0.858  Venezuela  0.650  0.400 
 
Table A2: Regional breakdown of available observations 
Region  No of cases
Africa 3
Asia 9
Australia 1
Eastern Europe  12
North America  1
South America  8
Western Europe  12
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Information on World Value Survey data 
Primary data were obtained from the “Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung” 
in Cologne. Waves are 1981-84, 1990-93, 1995-97, and 1999-2001. When several 
years of data on the same question are available for a country, arithmetic averages 
were used in the analyses.  
 
Original wording of questions 
LEGAL CONFIDENCE 
Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed [here the legal system], how 
much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or 
none at all?  
TRUST 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be 
too careful in dealing with people? 
•  Most people can be trusted 
•  Can't be too careful [TRANSLATION: ="have to be very careful"] 
•  Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT] 
 
Questions used for constructing factor “COLLECTIVE ACTION” 
1. Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? 
•  Run by a few big interests 
•  Run for all the people 
•  Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT] 
2. Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could 
you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member 
of that type of organization? Categories: Active member, Inactive member or Don' t 
belong. 
•  Church or religious organization  
•  Sport or recreation organization  
•  Art, music or educational organization 
•  Labor union  
• Political  party   
•  Environmental organization  
• Professional  association     27
• Charitable  organization   
•  Any other voluntary organization  
3. Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, 
while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. 
Please use this scale where 1 means "none at all" and 10 means "a great deal" to 
indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way 
your life turns out.   28
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